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Abstract
In this paper we empirically analyse the impact of retirement bene￿ts on consumption and
personal saving in South Africa using the Feldstein 1974 speci￿cation and procedure. By using
a basic extended Ando-Modigliani life cycle model we show that the introduction of retirement
programs crowds out discretionary household saving and consumption of contributors to such
programs. There against, bene￿ts paid by these programs contribute positively to consumption
with a concomitant decline in the national pool of savings.
However, taxes on retirement bene￿ts a⁄ect the discounted value thereof and any change
in such tax policy would therefore a⁄ect the saving behaviour of contributors in the opposite
direction of the tax policy. We use time series data on consumption per capita, disposable
labour-income per capita and pension and bene￿t payments from provident funds both public
and privately managed. Using OLS, we ￿nd that estimates of retirement bene￿ts are robust
when regressed with the per capita government de￿cit and per capita durable consumption.
The estimates are also stable when regressed with the full Barro speci￿cation (which includes
the per capita government de￿cit, per capita durable consumption expenditure and the product
of unemployment and per capita disposable income).
JEL Classi￿cation: H; H5; H55
Keywords: social security, pension funds, retirement, taxes, consumption, saving, South
Africa
1 Introduction
With the ageing of the ￿Baby Boom￿population, budget priorities are switching towards increased
social spending. Many governments are initiating reforms in their social security programs to ensure
that individuals enjoy quality retirement with a smaller burden on government to care for the aged.
Such social security program reforms (with mandatory contributions) are necessary to ensure that
individuals with low income and therefore also low levels of discretionary saving be taken care of
after retirement. In many of these cases governments allow di⁄erent concessions for individuals, with
the cost carried by government in terms of foregone revenue.
South Africa is now in the process of seeking ways to assist individuals in the lower income groups
to be able to save for their retirement. The Katz Commission (1995) and the Smith Committee (1995)
also recognized and emphasized the important role of pension funds for retirement. Most recently
a discussion paper by the National Treasury of South Africa published in March 2006, highlights
the role of retirement funds and recommends that more competition in the retirement industry
(this is between the suppliers of the retirement products) be allowed including a gradual setting
of minimum values for early termination. In its ￿Second discussion paper￿(February, 2007) The
￿Department of Economics, University of Pretoria
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1National Treasury of South Africa suggests the implementation of a social security and retirement
funding system which is more inclusive and in which saving, risk pooling, self-reliance and social
solidarity will be more ￿rmly rooted.
Thus, the question is to what extent mandatory saving would complement or substitute discre-
tionary saving to provide for retirement and also contribute to national saving. There is, for example,
a view that higher saving rates for some East Asian countries and China could be attributed, in
part, to compulsory saving for retirement (Loayza, et. al 2000).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 deals with the general concepts regarding
tax practises on social security funds. Section 3 looks at the tax treatment of pension funds in
South Africa. Section 4 investigates the e⁄ect of retirement bene￿ts paid by pension and provident
funds on consumption and saving, using a simple life cycle model pioneered by Ando and Modigliani
(1963). Section 5 concludes with some policy implications.
2 Tax Practices on Social Security Schemes
Due to the ageing of the population and high levels of unemployment, government expenditure is
under pressure to provide minimum standards of living to that part of the population with low or no
income and who, therefore, lacks accumulated savings for retirement or unemployment insurance.
In many countries the ageing of the population has been followed by a decline in national saving
rates (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and ServØn, 2000). Such a decline in saving rates constrains the
performance of the economy where governments extract tax revenue to ￿nance expenditures on
social insurance (protection) programs. As a result mandatory retirement contributions have been
implemented in many cases in order to provide income to the aged. Therefore, contributions to
retirement funds are regarded as crucial to provide for a reasonable standard of living during old
age. However, the macro implications of such mandatory saving policies are not clear.
Some countries rely heavily on the availability of long-term saving instruments for retirement
as an important vehicle to increase national saving (Krever, 2002). Since these are seen as long-
term saving instruments, the question is what ￿scal treatment they should be given? One view is
that these kinds of savings can only be encouraged by a tax dispensation embodying appropriate
incentives. Whether such saving is available for the ￿nancing of investment programs as in the case
of discretionary saving is a contentious issue but not discussed in this paper. The question is to what
extent the returns on retirement saving could be taxed within the parameters of tax neutrality and
the impact of tax on the intrinsic value of the savings (Burman, 2002). Therefore, a brief synopsis
of the requirements of a ￿good tax system￿may be useful to illustrate the margins with which taxes
can be used as incentive to boost savings for retirement.
2.1 Requirements of a Good Tax System
In assessing how taxes on retirement bene￿ts may a⁄ect saving, the following general principles of
a sound tax system have to be considered (Treasury, 2002):
1. Economic e¢ ciency: to ensure that the tax system minimally interferes with economic activity,
thereby optimising the allocation of scarce resources and minimises distortions in the economy
(allocative e¢ ciency).
2. Administrative e¢ ciency: administrative costs borne by the revenue authority and compliance
costs for taxpayers should be minimised.
3. Revenue adequacy: the tax system should raise su¢ cient revenue for government to meet its
expenditure commitments.
24. Equity: tax levied must relate to the ability to pay, that is individuals in similar purchasing
power positions should carry an equal tax burden (tax progressivity - Jha, 1998).
5. Stability: the tax system should be such that stability in the revenue base is assured. The
broader the tax base, the less the risk of instability of revenue.
Some of these principles may be con￿ icting, and policymakers have to identify and balance such
con￿ icting objectives.
2.2 The tax treatment of retirement bene￿ts
The most commonly used tax regime applicable to retirement bene￿ts in OECD countries is the
traditional EET (￿Exempted￿when a contribution is made (the taxpayer is not taxed on the income
which is ￿transferred￿ to the pension fund), tax ￿Exemption￿ on funds￿investment income and
￿Taxes￿on received bene￿ts) system, where accumulated bene￿ts from pensions are fully taxed at
retirement. This tax method for pension funds is not favourable in an environment where government
is under ￿nancial pressure (as in most developing countries), and the level of contributions and
pension assets are growing, since it defers tax revenue to when individuals start receiving their
bene￿ts. Because of this limitation some countries have considered di⁄erent types of tax structure
like TEE (￿Taxes￿on contributions) in other words, the contribution is made to the pension fund
out of after-tax income, tax ￿Exemption￿on funds￿investment income and tax ￿Exemption￿on
bene￿ts). In this way pensions are taxed when contributions are made and exempted when received.
The TEE tax system raises revenue at the time of contribution, but the revenue is less than in the
case of EET, since in the latter case the tax includes the earning on savings invested. However,
both systems allow the individual to receive equal bene￿ts. For example, suppose a contribution of
R10 is taxed at 10% and earns a 10% return to the contributor living one period (R10 - 10*0.1 =
R9 after tax) when the contribution is made with bene￿ts received equalling R9 + 9*0.1 = R9.90.
When taxed according to the EET system the tax is R10 + 10*0.1 = R11 with bene￿ts received
equalling R11 ￿11*0.1 = R9.90. It is possible, however, that government could structure the tax
system in order to a⁄ect perfect neutrality between di⁄erent permutations (such as TTT, EET, etc)
with respect to accumulated net bene￿ts, but in practice this is unlikely. These results could be
generalized to multi-periods.
Other variants of tax treatment of retirement saving are ETT (￿Exempt￿ , ￿Tax￿ , ￿Tax￿ ) and
TTE (￿Tax￿ , ￿Tax￿ , ￿Exempt￿ ) systems. These two systems provide the same bene￿ts to individuals
but revenue is higher with the ETT than with the TTE systems. With these two forms of tax
treatment individuals receive less bene￿ts compared to those received under EET or TEE. However,
government revenue is higher under ETT and TTE than under EET and TEE1.
Atkinson, Creedy, and Knox (1998) conclude that when comparing the Australian approach
to the tax treatment of retirement bene￿ts to the EET of OECD countries, the latter performs
better with regard to accumulated bene￿ts because of the nature of the retirement tax system. The
Australian case is based on ￿Tax￿ , ￿Tax￿ , ￿Tax￿(TTT), that is, ￿Taxes￿on contributions, ￿Taxes￿
on funds￿investment income and ￿Taxes￿on bene￿ts. However, revenue collection is delayed in the
case of the OECD with the net e⁄ect on individuals pending in part on their earning pro￿les. The
Australian tax structure a⁄ects the size of retirement bene￿ts, but it advances revenue from such
savings. Nevertheless, the authors agree that there are minimal di⁄erences between the OECD and
the Australian tax structures, when assessed in terms of the aggregate measures (Kakwani index) of
lifetime income, used to assess the progressivity within the cohort of full time workers. Thus, when
comparing TTT to EET the tax system that any government chooses depends on the policymakers￿
objectives. If the objective is to collect more revenue the ETT or TTT (the Australian system) will
be preferable, but if the objective is to provide individuals with better standards of living during
1For more details see Dilnot, A. (1992
3retirement, then the OECD (EET system) seems to be preferred from the viewpoint of the well
being of retired individuals.
The evaluation of the tax treatment of retirement bene￿ts is important in terms of the national
policy objective for retirement funding. Because the provision of retirement bene￿ts is sensitive at
the individual level, the system of providing for retirement bene￿ts must have su¢ cient internal
coherence to ensure its long term sustainability. Thus, to guarantee the sustainability of providing
retirement income, many governments o⁄er di⁄erent incentives related to the di⁄erent assets in which
pension funds invest, allowing for investment diversi￿cation and avoiding arbitrage. The latter is
because incentives are given to funds and not assets. Funds with higher tax incentives could buy
assets from funds with lower tax incentives and make a pro￿t. However, since government o⁄ers
equal incentives to various funds such a possibility of arbitrage between di⁄erent funds and assets
investment is not possible. .
3 Tax treatment of Pension Funds in South Africa
In order to comply with the general principles identi￿ed by the Smith Committee (1995), the South
African government committed itself to the following tax treatment of retirement savings:
1. Consistent treatment of private and public sector funds.
2. Neutrality between forms of retirement provision.
3. Minimisation of opportunities for tax arbitrage.
4. An incentive for lifetime annuities.
5. Taxation of income as it arises (given the EET system) rather than when paid
The tax dispensation with regard to retirement provision in South Africa is partly in￿ uenced
by the need to expand the revenue base, as in the Australian case. In 1995 the Katz Commission
estimated that, on average, government had lost R11 billion in revenue per year because of the
generous tax treatment of pension funds. The Katz Commission recommended the overall retirement
saving contribution rate to retirement funds to be capped at 22.5 per cent (with 7.5 per cent per
employee contribution, qualifying as a tax deduction and 15 per cent per employer). Furthermore,
the Commission recommended that a tax on retirement funds be implemented at a rate of 30 per
cent on their taxable pro￿ts.
Retirement funds in South Africa consist of pension funds, provident funds and retirement an-
nuity funds, registered under the provision of the Pension Funds Act 1956 (Treasury, 2002). Until
the 2007/08 ￿nancial year contributions to these funds have been subjected to the ETT (￿Exempt￿
￿Tax￿￿Tax￿ ) tax system, i.e. exempted when the contribution is made, a tax on the fund￿ s in-
vestment income and then a tax on bene￿ts paid. In 2004 members of retirement funds amounted
to 8,349,318, of which 7,025,125 were active. It was estimated that assets worth R720 billion were
managed by retirement funds during that year (Business Report, 22/12/2004). In South Africa,
over 70 per cent of those in formal employment are members of private retirement funds (Treasury,
2002). .
44 Tax on retirement bene￿ts and its impact on consumption
and saving behaviour.
Pre-empting the outcome of the research results one would assume that taxes on bene￿t payments
negatively a⁄ect consumption2 - saving decisions during the life cycle of an individual with such
taxes resulting into a bias towards investment in assets that are less taxed or tax-exempt. In this
regard the impact on saving is more severe within low-income groups, whose capability to save for
retirement is almost non-existent. Thus, an adequate form of tax treatment through incentives to
save for retirement, which also includes low income groups, seems to be of utmost importance. Some
authors argue (see for example Krever, 2000) that individuals with higher income tend to save even
without inducement, while low income individuals ￿nd it di¢ cult to save and rather treat any such
inducements as a tax. An inducement of this kind is regarded as a tax since saving for retirement
does not re￿ ect as such in the standard individual consumption-saving decision. Therefore, any
decision outside this ￿normal￿ decision-making process is considered a tax which a⁄ects lifetime
consumption and saving behaviour. The result is that such incentives only encourage saving for
retirement by the middle-income groups (Krever, 2002). However, by taxing retirement bene￿ts
even the latter group may be encouraged to substitute current consumption for future returns on
investment especially if such taxes are relatively high.
5 Quantifying the impact of retirement saving on consump-
tion and personal saving
In their canonical model Ando and Modigliani (1963) assume the utility of individuals to depend
on their planned bequests (a homogenous function of planned bequests and planned consumption).
Secondly, ￿the resources the individuals channel for bequest are an increasing function of the individ-
ual￿ s resources, relative to the average level of resources of his/her age group￿ . Thus, the Ando and
Modigliani model implies that individuals strive to maintain their standard of living by adjusting
their consumption and saving decisions over their entire life cycle.
The model also speci￿es consumption as a function of disposable wage income and non-wage or
property income. Using the Ando-Modigliani speci￿cation, many other studies have been conducted.
Feldstein (1974), in one of the most cited studies in this regard, extended the Ando-Modigliani spec-
i￿cation to include the e⁄ect of social security wealth on consumption. Barro (1978) proposed
another modi￿cation to the study by Ando and Modigliani and the Feldstein speci￿cations to in-
clude the e⁄ect of per capita government surpluses and real per capita consumption expenditure
on durable goods. He suggested that unemployment be entered into the equation as the product of
the unemployment rate and the level of real per capita disposable income. The reasoning behind
this (within the context of a macroeconomic single equation model) is to discount the e⁄ect of a
change in the unemployment rate on real per capita disposable income. For example, higher rates
of unemployment would lower per capita disposable income and therefore, the e⁄ect of retirement
bene￿ts on the consumption equation would be sensitive to the levels of unemployment.
Given its emphasis on social security, we decided to use the Feldstein￿ s (1974) speci￿cation to
investigate the extent to which retirement bene￿ts in South Africa a⁄ected personal consumption and
saving between 1970 and 2003. Consumption is estimated as a function of disposable labour-income
and pension and provident bene￿ts (both o¢ cial and privately administered):
ConsPC = f(YdPC, YdPC(-1), TBENPC)
where ConsPC is real per capita consumption, YdPC is real per capita disposable labour income
and TBENPC is real per capita total pension and provident fund bene￿ts. To test for the sensi-
2Taxes on retirement bene￿ts will have important e⁄ects on the way individuals look at saving for retirement. In
other words, taxes on retirement bene￿ts a⁄ect the consumption-saving decisions of an individual.
5tivity of the retirement bene￿ts coe¢ cient in the model, we re-estimate the consumption equation
above, taking into account the Barro (1978) suggestion. Thus we enter the product of the unemploy-
ment rate and per capita disposable income (YdUNPC), the government surplus/de￿cit per capita
(gdefPC) and per capita consumption expenditure on durables (CdurgPC).
(Note: we do not di⁄erentiate between bene￿ts paid and the stock of wealth and assume that
an increase in the former will automatically increase the stock of wealth. The impact thereof is that
consumption of retirees is a⁄ected accordingly.)
5.1 Data and Empirical Results
All data used in this study have been obtained from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB)
Quarterly Bulletin and data on population numbers were sourced from the publication of the World
Development Indicators (2005), comprising a range of 34 years.
We conducted unit root tests on all variables in the model. The results of the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller and KPSS tests show that all variables (in natural logarithms and in levels) are I(0)
except the interacted unemployment variable, consumption per capita and both total and privately
administered pension bene￿ts, which are I(1). The results of the long-run equation obtained from
the Engle-Granger two-step estimation procedure are shown in Table 1, with all variables in natural
logarithms. Table 2 shows the results of the Error Correction Model (ECM) and the coe¢ cients
of ResTBENPC and ResTPAPPPC are adjustment coe¢ cients or short-run dynamic adjustments
for regressions 3 and 4 respectively. The results show that total and privately administered pension
bene￿ts play no role in the adjustment process and the speed of adjustment is -0.35, in other words,
with a one per cent shock in the explanatory variables, 35 per cent of the disturbance in consumption
is adjusted in the ￿rst period.
These results are similar to the results from the basic extended life cycle model by Feldstein (1974
and 1995). Because of this similarity we decided to only use results from the extended Feldstein
model (Table 3) to evaluate the e⁄ect of pension bene￿t payments on consumption (and thus on
personal saving) in South Africa. The results in Table 3 show that almost all household disposable
wage income in South Africa is spent on consumption (0.98). This relatively high marginal propensity
to consume has increased over the past number of decades, probably re￿ ecting access to credit by
those who have managed to become part of the ￿￿rst economy￿but also the sizeable proportion
of income earners in the lower income categories (Prinsloo, 1994, 2002 and Aron and Muellbauer,
2000).
In the case of total payouts from retirement funds both privately and o¢ cially administered
(Regression 1 in Table 3) the marginal propensity to consume amounts to about 0.06, which is more
than double the coe¢ cient (0.028) for the US as estimated by Feldstein (1995) and is statistically
signi￿cant.
Regression 1 is re-estimated in Regression 2 (see Table 3) by substituting the bene￿ts paid by
pension and provident funds privately administered for total bene￿ts paid by (TPAPPPC). The
reason for such manipulation is to ￿nd the most appropriate speci￿cation and most importantly to
separate the e⁄ects. For example, as concluded below it seems as if pension and provident funds
privately administered are the most dominant ones regarding its impact on consumption.. In this
regression the marginal propensity to consume increases to 0.11, which is almost double the marginal
propensity to consume as measured in regression 1 and is statistically signi￿cant. The results show
that for each percentage change in bene￿ts paid by a privately administered pension fund total
consumption expenditure will change in the same direction by 0.11 percent.
Using the estimated coe¢ cients of the Feldstein based model we calculated the e⁄ects of pension
and provident fund bene￿ts paid on consumption and savings with saving merely the residual between
income and consumption in 1996 (one year after the Katz and Smith recommendations) and then
again in 2003. (We use these dates in order to measure the e⁄ect of proposal changes in the relevant
legislation). Using the coe¢ cient for total per capita bene￿t payments in regression 1 (Table 3)
6it can be said that the total bene￿ts paid contributed towards an increase in total consumption
expenditure of more or less an equal amount (with a concomitant amount of dissaving). However, if
no contributions had been made, only R26 225 million would have been available for consumption
and discretionary saving and given the consumption and saving coe¢ cients, R25 806,4 million and
R416,6 million would have been consumed and saved, respectively.
The combined e⁄ect on saving of bene￿ts received from and contributions made to pension and
provident funds during 1996 was R1.98 billion and in 2003 it increased to R3.441 billion. This implies
that household potential discretionary saving was reduced by 4.0 per cent in 1996 and by 6.92 per
cent in 2003. These results are comparable to ￿ndings from studies for other countries. Feldstein￿ s
(1995) study for the US for example, indicated that programs aimed at retirement saving crowd out
personal saving. The decline in household saving in South Africa is also supported by time-series
analyses done by Aron and Muellbauer (2000) and Prinsloo (1994, 2002).
It should also be noted that the ratio of bene￿ts received to contributions made increased from
108,7 to 124,7 between 1996 and 2003. The reason is probably the increase in returns on retirement
investment in the latter period compared to the ￿rst period. Also, it indicates that a substantial
portion of bene￿ts are not backed by contributions and rely to a large extent on investment returns
which might be problematic from a sustainability point of view.
Since a tax on bene￿ts reduces the returns on such savings, individuals might seek other forms of
savings like buying property or investing in assets other than pension and provident funds, pending on
the level of taxation. Thus, the tax treatment given to pension funds in South Africa can have adverse
e⁄ects on saving for retirement through the pension funds, depending on how individuals perceive
their bene￿ts during retirement. Retirement saving is a⁄ected by the way in which individuals
perceive the tax system applied to retirement funds, for example whether ￿EET￿ , ￿TEE￿ , ￿TTT￿ ,
etc. If the perception is that the tax system would be bene￿cial, individuals would tend to save
more via these funds and vice versa.
5.2 Tests for the sensitivity of social security in the model.
We include the Barro (1978) modi￿cation by adding to the Feldstein speci￿cation unemployment,
the government de￿cit and consumption expenditure on durable goods that may also in￿ uence the
implied impact of social security on saving. The estimates are shown in regression 1 in Table
4, with the interacted variable unemployment-per capita disposable labour-income (YdUN). The
coe¢ cient of total bene￿ts paid declines from 0.055 in the previous regression in Table 3 to 0.036
but remains statistically signi￿cant, while the coe¢ cient of the interacted unemployment variable
has the wrong sign and magnitude although statistically signi￿cant. This result is similar to that
found by Feldstein (1995) in terms of robustness of the coe¢ cient of the variable representing social
security but di⁄ers in terms of signi￿cance from the interacted variable. We re-estimate regression
2 with the interacted unemployment variable and ￿nd that the coe¢ cient of pension and provident
funds privately administered, drops from 0.11 to 0.09 but remains statistically signi￿cant, while the
coe¢ cient of the interacted variable is positive and insigni￿cant.
We then re-estimate regression 1 with the real per capita government de￿cit (gdefPC) and ￿nd
that the coe¢ cient of retirement bene￿ts (total) changes only marginally from 0.055 to 0.053 while
remaining statistically signi￿cant. The coe¢ cient of the government de￿cit, however, is positive
and statistically signi￿cant. Re-estimating regression 2 with the real per capita government de￿cit,
we ￿nd that the coe¢ cient of pension and provident funds privately administered is essentially
unchanged and the coe¢ cient of the government de￿cit is positive and statistically signi￿cant. We
then repeat the exercise by estimating regression 1 with per capita consumption expenditure on
durable goods (CdurgPC) and the results show that the coe¢ cient of retirement bene￿ts (total)
does not change much and remains signi￿cant, while the coe¢ cient of consumer durable goods is
positive but not statistically signi￿cant. By including per capita consumer expenditure on durable
goods in regression 2, the coe¢ cient of pension and provident funds privately administered slightly
7increases to 0.12, but the coe¢ cient of CdurgPC is not signi￿cant.
The estimates show mixed results with only some of the ￿ndings comparable to that of Feldstein
and others. By repeating the exercise for both regressions 1 and 2 (Table 4 ￿ full tests 7 and
8) with the Barro (1978) full speci￿cation, we ￿nd that the coe¢ cient for total pension bene￿ts
received declines slightly to 0.04, with the coe¢ cient of expenditure on durable goods not signi￿cant.
The coe¢ cient for bene￿ts received from pension and provident funds privately administered in
the full Barro (1978) speci￿cation declines to 0.05 but remains statistically signi￿cant, while the
coe¢ cients for the variables government de￿cit and consumer expenditure on durable goods are
not signi￿cant. In Table 5 we present a sensitivity test of the results from the Engle-Granger two-
step estimations which con￿rm the previous results. The coe¢ cient of pension and provident funds
privately administered in regression 8 remains unchanged and is statistically signi￿cant at 1 per
cent.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyse the impact of retirement bene￿ts on consumption and personal savings in
South Africa by using the extended traditional life cycle model of Ando and Modigliani (1963). As
explained in the ￿rst part of the paper di⁄erent tax regimes would impact di⁄erently on retirement
saving behaviour but due to a lack of data required for empirical analysis this impact could not
be measured. Thus, given the existing tax regime in South Africa (EET) we limit the analysis to
bene￿ts paid by private and government pension funds and its impact on consumption and saving
with the latter simply the residual between income and consumption expenditure. Our results
suggest that both in 1996 and 2003, social security (as represented by retirement bene￿ts received)
crowded out discretionary savings by 4,3 per cent and 7,5 per cent, respectively. Thus, discretionary
saving is largely substituted by compulsory saving through contractual contributions to retirement
programs. Unfortunately, these programs are not inclusive with a large portion of the economically
active population excluded from it. With discretionary saving being the backbone of the saving pool
from which investment has to be ￿nanced, the macro economic implications of this phenomenon
with regard to provision for retirement needs to be investigated. Given the fact that in a life cycle
hypothesis context individuals tend to maintain their consumption patterns during their life span,
changes in the tax regime that a⁄ect the returns on such contractual saving will change consumption
behaviour in the opposite direction. Since a tax on bene￿ts reduces the returns on such savings,
individuals might seek other forms of savings like buying property or investing in assets other than
pension and provident funds ￿a phenomenon that could clearly be observed during the past number
of years.
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Table 1: Dependent variable – lnConPC –
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Table 2: Dependent variable - D(lnConcPC) – ECM: 
Adjustment coefficients (short-run dynamic adjustment) 
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ResTBENPC(-1) 
-0.351 
(0.1334)   















(0.1314)   








10Table 3: Dependent Variable - Per Capita Consumption 
(ConsPC) – Feldstein (1974, 1995) Specification 










(0.1360)   
TBENPC 
0.055 
(0.0063)    
TPAPPPC   
0.112 
(0.0111)   




Table 4: Dependent variable – ConsPC (Sensitivity Tests for the model in Table 3) 









































(0.0075)    
0.037 
(0.0099)   











(5.8786)   
     7.963 





GdefPC   
0.503 







CdurgPC    
0.115 







(Standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
 
11Table 5: Dependent variable - lnConsPC (Sensitivty tests for the model in Table 1) 
























(0.0087)     
0.06 
(0.0107)   
LNTPAPPP











(0.0385)    
      0.003 





GdefPC   
     0.00005 
    (0.00001)   
    0.00004 





LnCdurgPC    
0.057 







(Standard errors in parenthesis) 
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